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Abstract: Future conflict between armed forces will occur both in the physical domain as well as the information domain. The
linkage of these domains is not yet fully understood. We study the dynamics of a force subject to kinetic effects as well as a
specific network effect–spreading malware. In the course of our study, we unify two well-studied models: the Lanchester model of
armed conflict and deterministic models of epidemiology. We develop basic results, including a rule for determining when explicit
modeling of network propagation is required. We then generalize the model to a force subdivided by both physical and network
topology, and demonstrate the specific case where the force is divided between front- and rear-echelons. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals,
Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 599–605, 2013
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1. INTRODUCTION
The domains of conflict are constantly evolving, and with
them, the analytic methods to understand, prepare, and hope-
fully prevent conflict. Lanchester’s original (1916) [14] equa-
tions were in response to a (then) revolutionary change in
warfare—aircraft. Today, we sit poised on the beginning of
a new revolution: addition of the cyber domain. This change
needs to be understood in order to shape both acquisition and
operational strategies.
We focus our effort on the analysis of a large ground com-
bat force using a peer-to-peer (P2P) network susceptible to
cyber-infection. In our analysis malicious code, which we
henceforth collectively call malware, is introduced and spread
between tactical devices with the effect of reducing its hosts’
combat effectiveness. Accordingly, the force considered will
simultaneously contend with kinetic combat effects, which
we model as Lancheter aimed-fire, and cyber effects, which
we model as an epidemic process.
Our major contribution is to unify these classic ideas and
analyze the resulting model. Both structures have been stud-
ied independently and are independently well understood; we
propose and analyze the combined model. The goal is both
a better understanding of an important combat environment
as well as a deeper understanding of the trade-offs between
cyber and kinetic capabilities.
We focus on an extension of the general, or Susceptible-
Infected-Removed (S − I − R) epidemic as developed by
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Kermack and McKendrick [12], treating the simple, or S–I,
epidemic as an included case. We then combine it with Lan-
chester’s aimed fire and area fire models. Similarly, other vari-
ants of attrition action such as area fire or mixed effects (i.e.,
Deitchman’s Ambush model) may be developed following
our approach.
Our article is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review
relevant work. In Section 3, we develop our model. In Section
4, we present some analytic and numerical results. In Section
5, we extend our model to include nonhomogeneous mixing
and combat effects, and in section 6, we develop the model
for area fires.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Deterministic combat models are a staple of Military Oper-
ations Research; for an overview see [20, 9, 2]. Instanta-
neous malware spread in generalized Lanchester systems
is explored in [19]. For an overview of epidemic models,
see [6]. In particular, nonhomogeneous mixing models, as
presented in Section 5, are addressed in [8, 13, 18]. A more
recent approach to epidemics may be found in [15]. Previ-
ous authors have considered the spread of information, which
malware may be considered, in a military/national security
context. See Richardson [16, 17] as well as Bettencort et al.
[1]. Each of these authors consider the effect of ideas and epi-
demics, but do not consider the spread of ideas “weaponized”
the same way we treat malware in our development.
Malware spread on wireless networks is considered in [10].
Several articles by Jamil and Chen, notably [11], address the
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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spread of malware on networks as an S-I process with het-
erogeneous mixing. The specific case of epidemic S-I spread
on Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETS) is considered both
in [3] and [5].
Our approach breaks from the traditional models of infec-
tious disease in two important ways. The classic model of a
general epidemic, theS−I−R model introduced by Kermack
and McKendrick [12], assumes that members of the popula-
tion become infected through contact with infected members,
and then are removed from the infected population, through
recovery or death, after some exponentially distributed time
independent of the number of removals. Thus, the Removeds,
in class R are a bookkeeping variable to track the total num-
ber in the class and are not “active” in the same way as the
Infecteds (I). In our development, both class I and class R
act upon the other members of the population. Members of
class R are active and are in competition with class I. The
dynamics captured by this competition dynamic shows the
real-world “race” between malware and patches. The idea
of an epidemic-pushed patch is important when considering
the management of a MANET because information is shared
only via P2P connections. In our model, fighters are attrited,
that is, killed by the Red force, at rate linearly dependent
on the size of the red force, Z and in the area fire case also
dependent on the Blue force B. The second departure is that
the total population, N, is not static due to attrition from red
fighters. Classic analysis of the S − I −R model rests on the
fact that N = S + I +R for all times, and therefore, a degree
of freedom may be removed. In our analysis, the attrition of
the blue force is as much of interest as the epidemic process.
3. FORMULATION
We now make our thoughts about simultaneous conflict in
both the cyber and kinetic domains concrete. A Blue force,
B, is subject to simultaneous malware infection and kinetic
battle. The blue force is subdivided into three cohorts with
regard to malware; further refinements with respect to dis-
tance from the battlefront follow in Section 5. This blue force
is in a Lanchester–aimed fire battle with the Red Force, R,
which is monolithic with respect to malware.
Susceptible - class S Susceptible blue fighters are those
who have not been infected by the malware nor the cure
(patch). They are noted as class S, with the variable S(t).
On exposure to members of class I, they may become
infected at rate η. Likewise, on exposure to patched
fighters (class R), they may be patched and permanently
immune to the cyber infection. Class S fighters have an
effectiveness of βU (for β “UP”) relative to the red force.
Infected - class I Infected blue fighters are those who cur-
rently have the cyber infection, with the variable I(t).
They have effectiveness βD for β “Down” relative to the
Red force with the understanding that βD ≤ βU. Blue
fighters become infected from class S only, as noted
above.
Removed - class R Blue fighters, either S or I, become
patched or removed via contact with members of class
R with variable R(t). Members of class R have effective-
ness of βU relative to the red force and are no longer at
risk for cyber infection.
Red Force Red fighters (denoted by Z) are monolithic, in
the sense that they are not vulnerable to a cyber infection.
They have a single, uniform effectiveness parameter in
attriting the blue force of ρ.
When referring to the Blue force en masse, we use the
notation B(t), with the understanding that B (t) = S (t) +
I (t) + R (t).
3.1. Infection Process: Model Options
We now pause to ask a fundamental question: what mech-
anism spreads malware among the blue fighters? Malware
is different than biological pathogens because it is “disease
by design”; the rule-sets for spread and duration of action
are limited only by the imagination and programming skill
of the designer; for an example of the real life complexi-
ties of malware, see [7]. While there are potentially limitless
spread mechanisms, we highlight three that may be both oper-
ationally interesting and analytically tractable via differential
equation methods:
“Lanchster” infection It is possible that infection spreads
at a rate dependent on I alone. This particular mech-
anism makes malware like aimed fire and implic-
itly assumes that an infected computer may always
find—and infect—an uninfected computer.
Kermack–McKendrick infection Infection may spread at a
rate dependent on the product SI, the “classic” SIR
model.
Daley–Kendall infection It is also possible that malware
may have rules, such as “if another infected unit is
encountered, cease infection.” This is similar to the
mechanism proposed by Daley and Kendall [4] for
the analysis of rumor spread and may have important
implications, particularly if the adversary (red force) is
balancing the breadth of spread with avoiding detection.
Our analysis will focus exclusively on the Kermack–
McKendrick-like infection. Similarly, there are three com-
mon varieties of Lanchester models:
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Figure 1. A depiction of the internal epidemic process and exter-
nal Lanchester process. The ovals depict the interaction due to the
malware epidemic, whereas the squares depict the action of the force
as a whole. The red force is monolithic and has no interior dynamics.
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available
at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Aimed Fire Fighters on either side attrite their adversary
at a rate dependent on the number of fighters on their
side only. This is called aimed fire because it implicitly
assumes that each active fighter may find an adversary
to target.
Area Fire Fighters on either side attrite their adversary at a
rate dependent on the number of fighters on both sides.
This is called area fire because attrition depends both on
the number of shooters and the density of targets pre-
sented. Hybrids between aimed and area fire exist, and
are handled with fractional exponents, see [9].
Mixed effects Fighters on one side use aimed fire, and their
adversary uses area fire.
These three models are developed and exercised with
an instantaneous infection in [19]. Our analysis will focus
exclusively on aimed fire, where we believe that malware is
most important. Malware reduces the quality of connectivity
and information; we choose to illustrate it in an aimed-fire
context.
3.2. State Transitions
During any infinitesimal time period, h, the following
events may occur:
• S → Iat rateSIξh
• S → R at rate SRηh
• I → R at rate IRηh
• Blue fighter attrited at rate ρZh, weighted per-class;
for example, ρZ S
S+I+Rh• Red fighter attrited at rate [βU (S + R) + βDI ] h
For a summary, see Fig. 1. Upon taking limits, we produce
the following differential equation model,
dS
dt
= −ξSI − ηSR − ρZ S
S + I + R
dI
dt
= ξSI − ηRI − ρZ I
S + I + R
dR
dt
= η (SR + IR) − ρZ R
S + I + R
dZ
dt
= −βU (S + R) − βDI .
(1)
A typical instantiation of Eqs. (1) is shown in Fig. 2.
4. ANALYSIS
4.1. Preliminaries
It is clear that should the blue force win, in the sense that
Z (∞) = 0, then S (∞) and I (∞) will also equal 0, and
B (∞) = R (∞).
A feature of interest for the epidemic process is the max-
imum size of the epidemic in the absence of attrition. We
disregard the dZ
dt
equation in (1) and focus on the first three
expressions, when ρ = 0. We may take advantage of the fact
that in this specific case
B = S + I + R, (2)
along with the fact that we have set β = ρ = 0 to elimi-
nate any combat effects, we may exclude the Z variable. In
the particular case where the patch and malware spread via
similar mechanisms, therefore, letting ξ = η, and appropri-
ate substitution of (2) into (1), the system has a closed-form
solution,
Figure 2. A typical instantiation of the Lanchester-epidemic
model, with the following parameters: ξ = .001, η = .0005, ρ =
.05, βU = .1, βD = .01. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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S (t) = B (0) S (0)
S (0) + (B (0) − S (0)) eξB(0)t
I (t) = B(0)
2I (0)(
S (0) + (B (0) − S (0)) eξB(0)t) (R (0) + (B (0) − R (0)) e−ξB(0)t)
R (t) = B (0) R (0)
R (0) + (B (0) − R (0)) e−ξB(0)t .
(3)






(B (0) − R (0)) S (0)
(B (0) R (0) − R (0) S (0))
]
, (4)
from which the magnitude of greatest infection may be
obtained.
4.2. Time Scaling
When do epidemic effects of malware need to be explicitly
considered in a unified combat model? If the spread of the
cyber infection is very fast compared to the combat process
—for example, if the time until malware saturation is 100μs
and the rate of blue attrition due to red action is on the order
of 1 per min—then the disruption of the network may be
adequately treated as a uniform, catastrophic failure; this sit-
uation is described in [19]. Alternatively, if the spread of cyber
infection is very slow, then the effect may be negligible and
the attrition formulation alone is sufficient.
We make the following observation: in order for both the
cyber and kinetic effects to be of interest, the rate of blue
fighters leaving class S due to cyber effects should be on the
same order of magnitude as the rate of blue fighters being lost
to casualties. If the initial blue force is B0, it is clear that the
instantaneous rate of infection is always less than or equal to
ξB20/4, and the full model is most interesting in cases where
(βU − βD) ξS2(0)
4βUρZ(0)
≈ 1, (5)
which is to say that the loss in effectiveness for the
blue side due to cyber effects is on the same order
as loss in effectiveness from kinetic attrition. For cases
where (βU − βD) ξS2 (0) >> 4βUρZ (0), the cyber effects
occur very quickly relative to the battle and it is appro-
priate to model the effect as instantaneous. Similarly, if
(βU − βD) ξS2 (0) << 4βUρZ (0), the cyber infection
spreads so slowly as to be negligible in comparison to the
combat process, and may be ignored.
4.3. Pure Epidemic Versus Aimed Fire
If we let η = 0, βD = 0, and ρ = 0, the result is that the
red force uses an epidemic to disable the blue force, and the










and B (t) = S (t) + I (t). We use the fact that S(t) has a
closed form solution,
S (t) = B (0) − I (0) B (0)
I (0) + S (0) e−ξB(0)t ,
which we may substitute and solve to find an explicit solution
for Z,
Z (t) = max
(









from which immediately follows:
Z (∞) = max
(








Recalling that by definition, B (t) ≥ I (t)∀t , we are guar-
anteed that the last term in Eq. (8) will be negative. It has
the natural interpretation of losses inflicted by the blue side.
Equation (8) allows for quick consideration of the tradeoffs
between kinetic and nonkinetic effects and determines the
final condition, B (∞) , Z (∞) in terms of initial conditions
and parameters.
4.4. Time Until Patch Relsease
We may also ask “how long after the cyber infection is
introduced will the blue side release a patch?” This question
raises two issues: first, the time of spread before detection,
and second, the time to develop and deploy an effective patch.
A straightforward approach is to use the saturation percent-
age of the simple epidemic; we may define a saturation level
to be reached before the blue force begins developing a patch;
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Figure 3. An example of delayed patching. The infection spreads
until 50% of the population is infected, at approximately T = 1.6.
Then, two time periods later, a patch is deployed. This approach
illustrates trades between time to detect, time to develop patch, and
time to deploy patch. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Equation (9) does not account for combat losses; if the blue
force is large and losses are homogeneous across the field, this
is not a critical concern. Although noting this deficiency, we
may treat (9) as a simple metric for malware detection. Once
malware has been detected, there is a latency time, TL , that
it takes the blue force to develop and deploy a patch. We treat
this parametrically as a fixed quantity; other refinements are
possible. The goal is to be able to compare speed of detection,
rate of patch development, and rate of patch dissemination
under a single metric. Rate of patch dissemination and net-
work administrator decisions become especially important
when considering a nonhomogeneous force, as in Section 5.
Using this framework, we may examine the consequences
numerically, see Fig. 3.
5. NONHOMOGENEOUS MIXING
In principle, we may subdivide either force in as many
subsets as we desire, with inter and intra mixing parame-
ters. As an illustrative example, we subdivide the blue force
into two groups: the front-line troops, which we subscript
with F, and the rear-echelon troops, we subscript with N. For
simplicity, we assume the infection and patch spread via the
same pathways, that is, η = ξ . We do not assume that the
rate of communication from the front to the rear is equal to
the rate of communication from the rear to the front. Finally,
we group the adversaries’ preference for attacking the parts
of the force as ρF and ρN, and we retain the notation βU and
βD for “up” and “down” fighters. A diagram of this situation
is presented in Fig. 4.
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We introduce four mixing parameters: ξFF, ξFN, ξNN, ξNF.
For example, ξFN is the mixing from the front to the rear. Our
model now has seven classes–six of blue and one of red.
If we presume that the malware enters at the rear echelon,
it may be suppressed by slowing communication from the
rear to the front. The opposite situation is true of patches,
which may tend to originate at the rear. Therefore, different
cross-cohort communication schemes are advantageous for
different phases of the cyber/kinetic conflict. For an exam-
ple of the effect of the distribution of patched fighters in
determining the outcome of the battle, compare Fig. 5a with
Fig. 5b.
6. AREA FIRES
Although we feel that aimed fire is the most interesting case
for cyber-effects, we complete our exposition by discussing
the case of an area fire implementation. In the original aimed
fire case (1), the final term is of the form
−ρ ZS
S + I + R ,
where S
S+I+R is a correction factor accounting for the frac-
tional (per-group) exposure to red’s fire. In area fire, the
Figure 4. A block diagram of the mixing between forces. Each
force transmits messages within its class and across classes. The
subscripts are read “from A to B”; so ξFN is the transmission rate
from the front to the rear. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Figure 5. Two cases of nonhomogeneous mixing, demonstrating
the dramatic effect that the distribution of initial patches has on the
outcome of the battle. In both examples, ξFF = ξNN = .001, ξFN =
ξNF = .0005, βUF = .09, βUN = .063, βD = 0, ρF = .06, ρN =
.018. (a) Epidemic Lanchester combat with nonhomogeneous mix-
ing. In this example, the blue force is divided into two partitions,
Front F and Rear N, with 80% at the front initially at the front
and 20% of the force at the rear. Initial infections consist of 10%
of the front-line force and 5% of the back-line force at t = 0. 64
fighters both in the front and 16 fighters in the back have the patch
installed at T = 0. (b) A second example of Epidemic Lanchester
combats with nonhomogeneous mixing. This time, the 80 patched
fighters are redistributed with 8 on the front line and 72 in the rear.
This example illustrates the leverage of patched fighters placement.
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available
at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
magnitude of attrition is the product of the red and blue forces
en masse, leading to
−ρ ZS
S + I + R (S + I + R) = −ρZS.
The resulting area fire model is:
dS
dt
= −ξSI − ηSR − ρRSZ
dI
dt
= ξSI − ηIR − ρRIZ
dR
dt
= ηSR + ηIR − ρRRZ
dZ
dt
= −βUSZ − βURZ − βDIZ,
(11)
where we have introduced the notation ρR to remind us
that the area fire coefficient is not that same as for aimed
fire. Perhaps surprisingly, much of our prior analysis is
unchanged. The time of maximum infection found in Eq.
(4) does not change. The recommended threshold for specif-
ically studying cyber effects, Eq. (5) is changed slightly; for
area fire it becomes
(βU − βD) ξS2S(0)
4βUρZ(0)B(0)
≈ 1. (12)
The estimates of the time to patch in Section 4.4 are
unchanged as well. Finally, the comparison of pure-cyber
versus pure-kinetic effects of Section 4.3 may be made for
this model as well. Following the same logic that led to Eq.
(7) may be applied, yielding
Z (t) = Z (0)
[
B (0)











We have described the problem of combat with simultane-
ous cyber and kinetic dimensions, formulated a model based
on one set of choices for cyber- and kinetic- conflict, and
derived analytic results, to include a rule for determining
when detailed study of the cyber dynamic is required and
when it is not. We also include results highlighting the com-
petition aspect of spreading malware and counter-spreading
patches. Our goal has been to stimulate thought from the ana-
lytic community and provide a set of baseline results to scope
more complex efforts. The methodology presented here may
be applied to other choices with regard to both the malware
spread and Lanchester attrition.
One next step for this research is to consider stochastic
effects, which are not brought out in this first, exploratory
paper. We expect that a stochastic treatment will bring out
additional behaviors, and will be particularly useful when
the number of initial malware carriers is small. For example,
a stochastic treatment will allow us to consider the possibil-
ity that one or several initial malware carriers are attrited by
the red force - a possible outcome which our deterministic
model presented here does not allow. This might lead to oper-
ational insights for the joint employment of cyber and kinetic
warfare.
Another step for this research is to consider other types of
networks; we have assumed mobile networks with volatile
connections, so the assumption of a mass-action epidemic
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is acceptable. With specified network topologies, different
results may be obtained, and the structure of the network may
be part of the decision space for both sides. We hint at this
type of result in Section 5, but a fuller treatment is needed.
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